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COMMENT-LEGISLATION
LOTTERIES-SUGGESTED REFORMS IN ILLINOIS
The vast majority of jurisdictions, including Illinois, have constitutional
provisions enunciating a fundamental public policy against lotteries.1 Yet
everyday one can observe their increased use by the business community in
the promotion of such goods and services as groceries, movies, gasoline and
clothing even though many of these seem to clearly fall within the prohibi-
tion of such lottery provisions. Illegal bingo games and raffles flourish and
continue to provide charitable organizations with a substantial source of
income. Recently, two eastern states were persuaded to legalize state-run
lotteries in order to provide additional revenue for their educational systems.
In short, despite the stated basic public policy against lotteries, they exist,
legally and illegally, and may even be increasing in use. It is the purpose of
this note to examine the lottery in terms of its definition and to analyze it in
relation to the constitutional provisions designed to guard against lotteries,
giving special emphasis to the relevant Illinois provision. Furthermore, this
note will discuss the present day usage to which the lottery is put. By ex-
amining these usages in relation to the social, political, and legal principles
applicable, conclusions will be drawn as to which usages, if any, should be
legalized. Recommendations regarding the methods by which Illinois may
realize desirable legalization of lotteries through the proposed Constitutional
Convention will also be offered.
ELEMENTS OF A LOTTERY
It is necessary for a thorough comprehension of this subject to have an
understanding of the definition of a lottery. Although courts have stated that
it has no technical meaning in law distinct from its popular significance,2 it
has been defined by Illinois statute as:
[A]ny scheme or procedure whereby one or more prizes are distributed by chance
among persons who have paid or promised consideration for a chance to win such
prizes, whether such scheme or procedure is called a lottery, raffle, gift, sale or
some other name.8
1 Hanson, The Validity of Not For Profit Lotteries, 30 CmI.-KFNT L. REv. 148, 149
(1951).
2 People v. Jackson, 22 Ill. 2d 382, 176 NE.2d 803 (1961), cert. denied, 368 US. 985
(1962).
3ILL. REv. STAT. Ch. 38, § 28(2)(b) (1967).
555
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
As can be seen from this statute, which is similar to those of other states,
there are three elements necessary for a lottery to exist: (1) the offering
of a prize, (2) the distribution of that prize by chance, and (3) the giving of
consideration for an opportunity to win the prize. 4
The elements of prize and chance are easily ascertainable. The element of
consideration, however, presents a much more difficult problem, and the courts
are divided as to its meaning. One line of cases measures the presence or
absence of consideration by the test used in contract law-a legal benefit to
the promisor or a legal detriment to the promisee.5 These jurisdictions have
thus held that benefits flowing to the operator of the lottery scheme in the
form of increased patronage, business, and profits is sufficient consideration
to meet the requirement.6 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Illinois,
in People v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc., expressly rejected this theory.7 Their
view of consideration is that it must flow directly from one who is given the
opportunity to win the prize, and that it must be in the form of money or
other thing of value, and not mere physical inconvenience or detriment to
the promisee. 8 Interestingly enough, there is a very small minority which
has concluded that consideration is not even a necessary element, and that a
lottery may arise by gift or otherwise, without any consideration. 9 The
determination of whether a "form of lottery" is, in fact, construed to be a
lottery is completely dependent upon the interpretation of the jurisdiction
in which the lottery is conducted. 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION OF LOTTERIES
Some constitutional provisions prohibiting lotteries are self-executing.
They are so named because they are complete in themselves and become
4 54 C.J.S. Lotteries § 2 (1948).
5 Furst v. A. & G. Amusement Co., 128 N.J.L. 311, 25 A.2d 892 (1942); Affiliated
Enterprises, Inc. v. Waller, 40 Del. 28, 5 A.2d 257 (1939). Contra, Commonwealth v. Wall,
295 Mass. 70, 3 N.E.2d 28 (1936). It should be noted that Wisconsin has adopted this
definition of consideration by statute. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 945.01(2) (b) (1) (Supp. 1967).
6 Troy Amusement Co. v. Attenweiler, 64 Ohio App. 105 (1940), aff'd, 137 Ohio St.
460, 30 N.E.2d 799 (1940).
731 Ill. 2d 535, 202 N.E.2d 473 (1964).
8 Id. at 540, 202 N.E.2d at 475. Prior to this decision, Illinois law bad been that
valuable consideration, as an element of a lottery, could consist of some right, interest,
profit, or benefit accruing to one party, and it was immaterial whether one party sus-
tained an actual pecuniary loss or the other an actual pecuniary benefit. People v.
Schaeffer, 44 Ill. App. 2d 374, 194 N.E.2d 804 (1963).
9 Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 N.J. 399, 117 A.2d 487 (1955) ; Herald Publishing
Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 111 A.2d 4 (1955).
10 Interpretation in at least one state has been fixed by statute. See WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 945.01(2)(b)(1) (Supp. 1967), which states consideration as, "anything which is a
commercial or financial advantage to the promoter or a disadvantage to any participant.
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operative without the aid of supplemental legislation." Others merely enun-
ciate a public policy against lotteries, but provide no means for such policy
to be carried out, or only authorize and direct implementation by action of
the legislature. The distinction between these two types of provisions is that
the latter becomes operative only upon passage of appropriate criminal legis-
lation, while the former is effective immediately.
12
The problem with a constitutional clause which is not self-executing, but
which directs the legislature to carry it into effect, is that it has only moral
force without legislative assistance. 13 While the legislature cannot be com-
pelled to enact implementing legislation which would enforce the prohibition,
it is important to note that the legislature is prohibited from passing statutes
authorizing lotteries without amendment of the constitutional provision
itself.'
4
The Illinois constitutional provision is two-fold in character, as it deprives
the legislature of the power to authorize lotteries, and requires the legislature
to pass statutes making lotteries a criminal offense. It appears in the following
language:
The general assembly shall have no power to authorize lotteries or gift enterprises
for any purpose, and shall pass laws to prohibit the sale of lottery or gift enter-
prise tickets in this state.15
The question as to whether this provision is self-executing is now moot, since
the legislature has properly performed the duty imposed upon it, by enact-
ment of an appropriate criminal statute. 16 This question would necessitate
an answer, however, if the statute were repealed or amended. Then if the
constitutional provision is deemed not to be self-executing, it would be with-
out force and effect, and could be disobeyed without fear of penalty. As the
section makes no rules for its enforcement nor fixes the nature of the pun-
ishment, rules of constitutional construction would apparently indicate that
1116 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 48 (1956).
12 Id.
13 This is because a court cannot issue a writ of mandamus against a legislative body
or its officers to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in nature, even
though the performance of that duty be required by law. Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 510,
152 N.E. 557 (1926); Jones v. Winters, 369 P.2d 135 (Okla. 1961). There are some
writers who contend that the courts are not completely without power, as a court of
equity may enjoin the conduct of lotteries on the ground that they amount to a public
nuisance. See Baker, An Equitable Remedy to Combat Gambling in Illinois, 28 Cm.-
KENT L. REV. 287 (1950).
14 State ex rel. Evans v. Brotherhood of Friends, 41 Wash. 2d 133, 247 P.2d 787
(1952) ; State ex rel. Steen v. Murray, 144 Mont. 61, 394 P.2d 761 (1964) ; State v.
Village of Garden City, 74 Idaho 513, 265 P.2d 328 (1953).
15 ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 27.
16 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 28(1) (1965).
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it would not be self-executing. 17 Of court this section could be rewritten so
as to make it self-executing and thereby avoid the necessity of implementing
and enforcing legislation. The elimination of this type of problem is seemingly
within the intended purposes of a constitutional convention, and the re-
writing of our provision to make it self-executing is recommended.
AREAS OF LOTTERY USE
Presently the lottery is being utilized in three areas, which, in varying
degrees, have received legal recognition and acceptance. These areas are (1)
the promotion of business, (2) the raising of revenue for governmental needs,
and (3) the providing of funds for charitable or other worthy purposes. The
following section will analyze each of these areas of use in order to determine
the advantages of legalizing it.
Promotion of Business
Lotteries as a method of business promotion have long been opposed by
public policy. 18 The primary rationale for this general condemnation is
ethical and not economic, as it is regarded as contrary to sound morality
that men should be tempted to seek "something for nothing" or for a very
little. Such practice is also considered an unfair method of competition, for
it encourages people to purchase goods not upon their merits, but rather upon
the chance of securing something for nothing.'9 Nevertheless, the practice
of using lotteries to stimulate business activity continues at an ever increasing
rate. One cannot travel past a service station without seeing large bright signs
advertising some sort of game or sweepstakes, nor enter a supermarket and
not be confronted with a game card. Is such activity now privileged or is it
that the law is not being properly enforced?
One of the earlier most often used schemes for advertising or promoting
legitimate business, and one which is most conducive to illustrate the legal
problem related thereto, is found in the "Bank Night" cases. 20 Generally,
this scheme provides for "free" registration of any individual in a book
maintained in a theater lobby, with each registrant receiving a permanent
registration number. A drawing by chance is then held on a specified ad-
vertised night, with the holder of the drawn ticket number receiving a prize.
21
17 Supra note 11.
18 PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES 138-40, quoted in Minter v. Federal
Trade Commission, 102 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1939).
19 Id.




While the many cases differ because of the facts involved and the wording of
the related statutes, the pertinent question in all of these cases, and the one
which illustrates the problem in this area most acutely, is whether the nec-
essary element of consideration is present in order to support a finding that
the scheme is a lottery. In State ex rel. Hunter v. Fox Beatrice Theater Corp.,
the court found that the registered buyers purchased considerably more with
their money than the privilege of attending a motion picture. They held that
the patrons made a contribution to the increased income of the theater own-
ers and that this contribution was sufficient consideration to constitute a lot-
tery.22 Following the same basic reasoning, other courts concluded that such
schemes attracted people to the theater who otherwise would not have
attended, and that this profited the operator and supplied the needed con-
sideration.23 However, in Roswell v. Jones, which represents a contrary view,
the court considered such a scheme as emanating no more harm than any
other method of advertising, and certainly not one which would lead people
to hazard their substance on a mere chance.24 They concluded that "profit
accruing remotely and indirectly to the person who gives the prize is not a
substitute for the requirement that he who has the chance to win the prize
must pay a valuable consideration therefore .... ,25
The Illinois position seems to follow this latter view. In People v. Eagle
Food Centers, Inc., retail grocery stores distributed cardboard coins, some
of which contained lucky numbers entitling the recipient to a prize. No pur-
chase was necessary, and those purchasing did not pay anything over and
above the amount normally. required for the same merchandise, as food prices
had not been raised nor had the quantity or quality of the food been lowered
to compensate for the prize. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the element
of consideration necessitates an actual passing of consideration from the
participant, in the form of money or other thing of value, and without it
there could be no lottery.28 The court therefore found that no lottery existed
in Eagle Food.
This problem of consideration is also very prevalent in the newer gasoline
station lottery-type schemes, but these operators have attempted to remove
their schemes from a lottery classification by distributing their tickets and
22 133 Neb. 392, 275 N.W. 605 (1937).
23 Iris Amusement Corp. v. Kelly, 366 Ill. 256, 8 N.E.2d 648 (1937); United-Detroit
Theater Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enterprise, 280 Mich. 425, 273 N.W. 756 (1937);
State ex rel. Beck v. Fox Kansas Theater Co. 144 Kan. 687, 62 P.2d 929 (1936); State
ex rel. Draper v. Lynch, 192 Okla. 497, 137 P.2d 949 (1943) ; Blackburn v. Ippolito, 156
So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1963).
24 41 N.M. 258, 67 P.2d 286 (1937).
25 Id. at 265, 67 P.2d at 290. See also People v. Cardas, 137 Cal. App. 788, 28 P.2d
99 (1933).
2631 Ill. 2d 535, 538, 202 NE.2d 473, 475 (1964).
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game forms to anyone requesting them without regard to purchase. For
example, certain service station operators in California engaged in a give-
away program as an advertising scheme to develop greater patronage. They
gave tickets away to anyone requesting them, at and away from their sta-
tions, and with or without a purchase. However, some operators raised the
price of gasoline one cent per gallon in order to finance the advertising pro-
gram. When the local retailers association sought to prevent such a practice
as a lottery and as an unfair method of competition, the Supreme Court of
California ruled in favor of the service stations. Seemingly ignoring the fact
that some operators had actually raised their prices, the court held that since
one could participate and win without expending any money on any mer-
chandise, there could be no passing of the valuable consideration necessary
to make the scheme a lottery.2 7 Thus, although many of those who made
purchases did, indeed, pay actual consideration in the form of higher prices,
the court chose to overlook this fact because one could receive the "chance"
without a purchase, and this right was the decisive factor in removing the
scheme from a lottery classification.
The Illinois courts have not yet been faced with a situation where the prices
have been actually raised in order to offset the costs of the advertisement,
for in People v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc., those who did purchase were not
required to pay anything in addition to the amount normally received for
the same merchandise. The chance to win was free monetarily, although the
participant did have to expend some physical effort in order to obtain the
game cards. However, where the prices are raised, more than a "mere physi-
cal inconvenience or disadvantage to the promisee" results, and there is an
actual passing of monetary consideration from some of the participants to
the operator. The fact that one may participate without a purchase should
not remove the scheme from a lottery classification-especially when con-
sidered in light of the increased prices which are paid by the majority. If
the Illinois courts are faced with such a scheme, it is hoped that they are not
misled by the element of consideration, which is so innocently cradled in
this type of scheme.
Regardless of how the element of consideration is concealed, it seems that
the more logical view is that if the operator receives a benefit in the form
of increased patronage, business, and profit, this benefit should be suf-
ficient to constitute the necessary consideration. Businessmen are not so
philanthropic as to give away something for nothing.2 8 Certainly if they did
not expect their additional profits to offset the costs of the scheme, they
27 California Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corporation of Fresno, Inc., 50
Cal. 2d 844, 330 P.2d 778 (1958). Accord, State v. Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc., 386
S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1964).
28 Reda, Lotteries as a Business Promotion, 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 698, 707 (1962).
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never would have undertaken it.2 9 And the mere fact that "some" people
could win without having themselves been detrimented certainly should not
be the factor removing such a scheme from a lottery, for the greater pro-
portion of participants do indeed pay actual consideration-usually in the
form of increased prices.
For the above reasons, the use of lottery type schemes for the promotion
of business has no apparent redeeming Value so as to cause an exception in
stated public policy and therefore should be prohibited in Illinois. Since the
Illinois Supreme Court has chosen to strictly interpret the concept of con-
sideration in such a way as to permit the above mentioned schemes, it is
necessary for the legislature to act in order to prevent their increasingly
widespread use.30 One practical approach is to provide a definition of con-
sideration as part of the constitutional prohibition itself, and thereby elim-
inate confusion as to its interpretation. A definition that includes anything
which gives a commercial advantage to the promoter or a disadvantage to
any participant would successfully rid the consumer of the ever increasing
lottery for business promotion. Such a definition is highly recommended to
a Constitutional Convention.
Raising of Public Revenue
Lotteries are also used as a source of public revenue. Such a use is not a
new idea. As an important feature of early American economic development,
it had tremendous popularity in the financing of roads, bridges, canals, and
schools. In times of currency shortage and rapidly growing population, it
provided an effective means of raising revenue which was well adapted to
financing the high overhead requirements necessary for the early growth
of our country.3' However, by the middle 1800's, the combination of the
financial drain on the economy and the increase of fraudulently-run lotteries
led to great public indignation over its continued use. This, along with federal
legislation forbidding the distribution of lottery materials through the mails,
sounded the death of the lottery.3 2 It was not until 1964, with the enactment
of the New Hampshire sweepstakes, that the public revenue lottery was
reborn. This, along with the New York State gambling lottery, begun in
1967, represent the only government-conducted gambling in the nation.3
29 Id.
30 Interestingly, this position was also expressed by the majority in the Eagle Food
case, when they held that if the technical concepts of consideration applicable in the
law of contracts are to apply, "the statute must read much plainer than it does and the
remedy must come from the legislature rather than the courts." Supra note 7, at 540, 202
N.E.2d at 476.
31 Rosen and Norton, The Lottery as a Source of Public Revenue, 44 TAXES 617 (1966).
82 Blanche, Lotteries Yesterday, Today, and Tommorow, 269 ANNALS 71, 72-73 (1950).
33 Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 4, 1968, at 44, col. 1-3.
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But with the advent of these two lotteries, the public is again questioning
its benefit. It is thus necessary to analyze both the social and economic
aspects of such lotteries, and to specifically examine the results in New
Hampshire.
Sociologists often point out that over-indulgence in gambling occurs when
the frequency of the opportunity for betting is high, the odds against losing
are low, and availability of credit betting is present.84 Relying upon this
proposition, proponents of the lottery are quick to hold that the lottery is
one form of gambling not conducive to immoderate gambling, because the
above factors are not usually present to a degree likely to cause harm. In
fact, some governments have established public revenue lotteries on the
belief that they would channel the public's propensity to gamble into a form
with the least adverse economic and social effect, while still providing finan-
cial aid to the social services.385
This view is successfully rebutted by others who hold that such a lottery
would do little to decrease the enticement of other forms of illegal gambling.
These other forms would attract the gambler because they usually contain
an important entertainment element involving better participation, con-
trasted with the passive role of the bettor in lottery forms of gambling. For the
same reasons, the legal forms of gambling such as pari-mutual horse racing
and casino gambling would be unaffected.86 This latter argument seems to
have more merit. Although the lottery may not encourage over-indulgence
in gambling, it seemingly would not reduce active participation in the other
existing forms. In fact, it would simply provide another "pot" for the bet-
tor's money. Another social disadvantage of the lottery as a form of raising
revenue is that it discriminates against lower income groups, as they buy
more than a proportionate share of the tickets sold. For instance, one Massa-
chusetts study showed that four out of five of those who could least afford
to gamble purchased the tickets.37 On a social level, it therefore appears that
the lottery is not favored as a source of public revenue.
Furthermore, the accepted body of economic analysis is also opposed to
the use of lotteries as a source of revenue for the government.8 This dis-
favor stems from three basic arguments. First, the lottery is a counter-cyclical
84 ROYAL ComsNssIoN ON BETTING, LoTTEuIs, AND GAMInG 1951 REPORTS, at 58-60
(1951).
85 How to Run a Lottery, 189 Tim ECONOWUST 1164-65 (1958).
86 Kinsey, The Role of Lotteries in Public Finance, 16 NAT'L. TAX J. 1 (1963). See also
Concord Daily Monitor, Feb. 13, 1968, at 4, col. 3.
87 Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1965.
88 The following economic analysis is based primarily on the works of Rosen and
Norton, supra note 31 and Kinsey, supra note 36.
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instrument.3 9 This means that net revenue would be expected to increase
during recessions and decrease during recoveries, because of a greater relative
desire to gamble during periods of declining income and high unemployment.
This is not a favorable economic result. Secondly, the cost of collection is very
high due to large administrative costs resulting from the need to protect
such a program from illegal gambling syndicate involvement. 40 Thirdly, the
principle of allocative tax efficiency is violated. This principle holds that the
marginal social costs of raising a unit of revenue by all taxes should be equal.
Since the lottery necessitates charging a price in excess of both social and
economic costs, the marginal conditions for efficiency in resource allocation
are by-passed. 41
The purpose of the New Hampshire sweepstakes was to provide sub-
stantial revenue for the educational system, and to stop burgeoning local
property taxes. In other words, it was to increase revenue without increasing
taxes. Unfortunately, neither goal has been accomplished. Property taxes
have continued to spiral upward and have forced the state to again reconsider
its present policy of having no state sales tax.42 Furthermore, the lottery has
failed to provide the added revenue anticipated by its sponsors. Originally
forecasted to add some five million dollars annually to the state, it has fallen
far short with the trend indicating that it will probably never reach that
goal.43
Although the New Hampshire lottery has apparently failed for the eco-
nomic reasons mentioned above, it is only fair to point out that it was also
hampered by the state's small population and by very inhibitory federal
provisions against lotteries.44 Since New Hampshire has such a small popu-
lation, the lottery had to be supported, for the most part, by sales to the
residents of neighboring states. To complicate matters, such sales could only
be made in New Hampshire, as the federal provisions provided strict pen-
alties against anyone importing or transporting lottery tickets, 45 mailing
tickets or related matter,46 or broadcasting information related thereto
47
across state lines. Consequently, the out-of-state residents had to come into
39 Rosen and Norton, supra note 31, at 624-25.
40 Rosen and Norton, supra note 31, at 624-25.
41 Rosen and Norton, supra note 31, at 624-25.
42 Rosen and Norton, supra note 31, at 620-21.
43 In 1964, its first year of operation, which was shortened because of legislative
political haggling, it netted only a mere $2.7 million. The result of the following year was
even less encouraging, as it produced only $2.4 million. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 1966, at 24.
4 4 Id.
4518 U.S.C. § 1301 (1966).
4618 U.S.C. § 1302 (1966).
4718 U.S.C. § 1304 (1966).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
New Hampshire in order to obtain their tickets, and it wasn't likely that
many people would travel for the mere opportunity to purchase a lottery
chance.
However, one cannot conclude that these federal regulations are inhibitory
only to a small state, for they have also seriously hampered the sales of
lottery tickets in New York. In operation only since 1967, the New York
lottery was originally predicted to produce gross sales of 360 million dollars
yearly, but has only resulted in an average sale of 5.5 million dollars a month
since June of 1967.48 As a result of the federal regulations, such simple tasks
as notifying winners and conducting correspondence about the lottery have
required unusual maneuvering, and have limited newspaper advertising to
only non-mail editions. 49 Although this is not the only factor affecting the
apparent failure of the lottery, it appears to be significant.
The lottery as a source of public revenue is rejected by the economic com-
munity, and it is disfavored by social scientists because of its discriminatory
tendency against lower income groups and because of its encouragement of
gambling in general. It has also proved a failure in the only two states to
have employed it, due primarily to the very strict federal regulations de-
signed to guard against all forms of lotteries and the unfavorable economic
factors mentioned above. Furthermore, a government, with so many other
methods of raising revenue at its disposal, should not have to resort to a
gambling device for such purposes. For these reasons, it is recommended
that Illinois continue its present policy of prohibiting this use of the lottery.
Raising Funds for Charitable Purposes
The third use to which the lottery is put is in the raising of funds for
worthy or charitable purposes, and usually takes the form of raffles, bingo,
or similar types of games. Generally, these fund raising schemes are let alone
by police and prosecuting authorities, because it would be politically un-
wise to interfere with them.50 Despite this general lack of enforcement, leg-
islatures are reluctant to amend existing prohibitory provisions on the ground
that lotteries are still morally and ethically wrong regardless of the form they
take. It seems difficult to accept such reasoning, however, in light of statutes
permitting pari-mutual gambling, which the legislatures were not reluctant
to authorize,5' and which the courts have held constitutional.5 2 Surely pari-
mutual horse racing is just as morally and ethically wrong as the lottery,
48 Supra note 33.
49 Supra note 33.
50 Ploscowe, The Law of Gambling, 269 ANNALS 1, 5 (1950).
51 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 8, § 37(a) (1967).
5 2 People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N.E. 439 (1932).
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and more so when compared to the good generated by the funds raised by
a church, hospital, or fraternal organization. The lottery for charitable pur-
poses is the most advantageous to have legalized.
If one agrees with the above position, the next step is to determine by
what methods the legalization of the charitable lottery can be realized. One
possible method is the enactment of legislation authorizing lotteries for char-
itable purposes and thereby drawing a distinction between commercial lot-
teries and those for a worthy purpose. However, would such legislation be in
violation of the existing provision? Unquestionably, where a state's consti-
tutional provision prohibiting lotteries is declared to be self-executing, the
legislature may not contradict it by authorizing certain types of lotteries.
This would be clearly unconstitutional. 53 However, where it is not self-
executing, it seems that the legislature may draw a distinction between dif-
ferent types of lotteries. Such classification would not be unconstitutional
provided it was not arbitrary or without a reasonable legal basis.54
Rather than be faced with the above question, another method would be to
carefully word the criminal statutes so as not to include penalties against the
operation of a lottery for charitable purposes. Ohio illustrates such a method.
They implemented their constitutional provision by prescribing penalties
only against an operator who was involved in a lottery scheme "for his own
profit."5 5 Upon a first viewing, one court concluded that so long as the game
of chance was conducted by charitable groups and the profits were expended
for charitable purposes, such games would not be for the operator's "own
profit" and therefore no penalty could attach.56 The court, by way of
dictum, also held that such activity would do no harm and might do a great
deal of good.57 With respect to this method, it is important to note that all
local statutes imposing criminal responsibility should also be removed or
amended to correspond to the current policy of the state legislature, for the
continuation of existing municipal ordinances could result in criminal liability
to the operator of the charitable lottery based upon these ordinances despite
the nonexistence of a state penalty.5"
However, the best approach for Illinois might be to rewrite the existing
53 Supra note 14.
54 People ex rel. Curren v. Wood, 391 Il1. 237, 62 N.E.2d 809 (1945) ; United States
v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87 (1950).
)5 O1o CONST. art. 15, § 6 and OHio REV. CODE § 2915.12 (Supp. 1966).
56 Jamestown Lions Club v. Smith, 45 Ohio Op. 157, 100 N.E.2d 540 (1951). Accord,
Commonwealth v. O'Connell, 293 Mass. 459, 200 N.E. 269, 103 A.L.R. 872 (1936);
State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940). Contra, State ex rel. Trampe v.
Multerer, 234 Wis. 50, 289 N.W. 600 (1940).
5 Jamestown Lions Club v. Smith, supra note 56, at 158, 100 N.E.2d at 542.
5 8 Nadlin v. Starick, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 272, 194 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
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constitutional provision and expressly exclude the charitable lottery from
prohibition. This could be supplemented by the enactment of a separate
licensing law which would authorize certain organizations to carry on chari-
table lotteries, provided that all net funds be used for worthy purposes. All
organizations desiring to operate a lottery would have to be licensed under
this law and detailed rules on qualifications would be set forth. Further-
more, a state commission could be created to supervise and enforce the
administration of these laws. Through this plan, the public's desire for a
legalized charitable lottery would be realized while concurrently providing
a method for protection against unscrupulous operators. It is this plan which
is recommended to the proposed Convention.59
CONCLUSION
The legalization of lotteries for the promotion of business should not be
favored. Although such a scheme may not harm the purchaser to the same
degree as he would be harmed by participation in other forms of lotteries,
he is tempted to make purchases or perform acts which he would not hive
ordinarily performed. Furthermore, there is a substantial detriment to the
owners of competing businesses who do not utilize such a promotional
scheme. If business promotion lotteries are to be illegal, the best definition
of consideration is to be found in the benefit-detriment theory of contract
law. Regardless of whether the participant is to purchase the product or
service at the regular or increased price, or merely to go to a certain desig-
nated place to register, the operator will receive some benefit. This benefit is
the motivating factor behind the scheme. Therefore, this benefit, by itself,
should provide the consideration necessary to make this scheme a lottery, and
thereby illegal. It is recommended that the Convention enact a constitutional
provision which would include a definition of consideration in accordance
with the above.
The lottery as a source of public revenue, which is rejected by the economic
community and social scientists and which has been a failure in the only
states to have recently utilized it, has little in favor of its legalization. Al-
though well adapted for raising revenue during our early economic develop-
ment, it no longer provides an effective means for this purpose. Accordingly,
it is recommended that Illinois continue its current policy of prohibiting this
use of the lottery.
The only form of lottery the legalization of which appears to be advan-
tageous is the one used to raise funds for charitable or worthy purposes. This
use possesses the least social and economic costs while providing the most
59 For an example of this system, see the plan in effect in New Jersey. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 5:8 (1959).
[Vol. XVII
